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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
MONROC, INC,, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent , 
vs. No. 87-0164 
M. TIMMIE SIDWELL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
1. Did the lower court err in concluding that defendant 
Timmie Sidwell was not entitled to additional compensation while 
she worked as a security guard at the Monroe Cottonwood Plant? 
PERTINENT STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
1. 29 U.S.C. §206 states the followir^g: 
(a) Every employer shall pay to each of his 
employees who in any work week . . . is employed in an 
enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of 
goods for commerce, wages at the following rates: 
(1) . . . not less than $3.35 an hour after 
December 31, 1980. . . . 
2. 29 U.S.C. §207 states the following: 
(a)(2) No employer shall employ any of his 
employees who in any work week (1) is employed in an 
enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of 
goods for commerce . . . (c) for a work week longer 
than forty hours after the expiration of the fourth 
year from [the effective date of the Fair Labor 
Standards Amendments of 1961], unless such employee 
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receives compensation for his employment in excess of 
the hours above specified at a rate not less than one 
and one-half times the regular rate at which he is 
employed. 
3. 29 U.S.C. §216(b) states the following: 
Any employer who violates the provisions of §206 
or §207 of this title shall be liable to the employee 
or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid 
minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, 
as the case may be, and an additional equal amount as 
liquidated damages . . . the court in such action 
shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the 
plaintiff . . ., allow a reasonable attorneys fee to 
be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action. 
In addition to these specific statutes a number of federal 
regulations enacted by the U.S. Department of Labor are also 
relevant to this appeal: 
29 C.F.R. §785.14 provides: 
Whether waiting time is time worked under the Act 
depends upon particular circumstances. The 
determination involves "scrutiny and construction of 
the agreements between particular parties, appraisal of 
their practical construction of the working agreement 
by conduct, consideration of the nature of the service, 
and its relation to the waiting time, and all of the 
circumstances. Facts may show that the employee was 
engaged to wait, or they may show that he waited to be 
engaged." Such questions "must be determined in 
accordance with common sense and the general concept of 
work or employment." (Citations omitted). 
29 C.F.R. §785.20 states: 
Under certain conditions an employee is considered 
to be working even though some of his time is spent in 
sleeping or in certain other activities. 
29 C.F.R. §785.21 provides: 
An employee who is required to be on duty for less 
than twenty-four hours is working even though he is 
permitted to sleep or engage in other personal 
activities when not busy. A telephone operator, for 
example, who is required to be on duty for specified 
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hours is working even though she is permitted to sleep 
when not busy answering calls. It makes no difference 
that she is furnished facilities for sleeping- Her 
time is given to her employer. She is required to be 
on duty and the time is work time. 
29 C.F.R. §785.22 provides: 
(a) General. Where an employee is required to be 
on duty for twenty-four hors or more, the employer and 
the employee may agree to exclude bona fide meal 
periods and a bona fide regularly scheduled sleeping 
period of not more than eight hours from hours worked, 
provided adequate sleeping facilities are furnished by 
the employer and the employee can usually enjoy an 
interrputed night's sleep. If sleeping period is of 
more than eight hours, only eight hours will be 
credited. Where no express or implied agreement to the 
contrary is present, the eight hours of sleeping time 
and lunch period constitutes hours worked. 
29 C.F.R. §785.23 provides: 
An employee who resides on his employer's premises 
on a permanent basis or for extended periods of time is 
not considered as working all the time he is on the 
premises. Ordinarily, he may engage in normal private 
pursuits and thus have enough time for eating, 
sleeping, entertaining, and other periods of complete 
freedom from all duties when he may leave the premises 
for purposes of his own. It is, of course, difficult 
to determine the exact hours worked under this 
circumstance and any reasonable agreement of the 
parties which takes into consideration all of the 
pertinent facts will be accepted. 
29 C.F.R. §516.1 through 516.10 provides: 
Every employer shall maintain and preserve payroll 
or other records containing information and data 
showing, among other things, the regular hourly rate of 
pay; the hours worked each work day ar^ d the total hours 
worked each work week; the total daily or weekly 
straight time earnings or wages and ai^ y additions or 
deductions from wages paid during each pay period; and 
the total wages paid each pay period. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE! 
A. Nature of the Case 
This action was originally commenced by Plaintiff Monroe, 
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Inc. as an unlawful detainer suit seeKing to evict Defendant from 
the Monroe Cottonwood Plant premises. Defendant counterclaimed 
alleging a violation of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act as to 
the wages she was paid during the approximate four years she 
worked for Monroe. 
B. Proceedings Below 
This case was tried to the Honorable Scott Daniels on March 2 
and March 3, 1987. At the conclusion of the testimony Judge 
Daniels rendered his opinion in favor of plaintiff Monroe in the 
amount of $300 for its unlawful detainer claim and in favor of 
Monroe, Inc. and against Defendant as to Defendant's Counterclaim 
of federal wage law violations. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment were 
subsequently entered by the lower court on March 20, 1987. A copy 
of these Findings and Judgment is attached herein as part of the 
appendix to this Brief. 
Defendant Sidwell appealed from the denial of any 
compensation for alleged violation of the federal wage laws. 
Plaintiff Monroe cross-appealed on the basis that the lower court 
should have trebled the damages awarded to it. 
C. Statement of Facts 
The general facts in this case are essentially undisputed. 
The main area of controversy concerns the scope of Defendant's 
work with Monroe, Inc. as well as the legal interpretation of the 
applicable statutes and regulations to this work. 
It was stipulated by the parties that Monroe is an enterprise 
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engaged in interstate commerce and has been so engaged at least 
since 1982- It has a yearly gross sales of at least $250,000 
since 1982- It is, therefore, an enterprise subject to the 
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, 29 U.S.C. §201 (Tr. Vol. I, p. 23)|. 
The Monroe Cottonwood Plant is located on 190 acres. 
Approximately 150 acres of this is fenced. (Tr. Vol I, p. 78). 
Buildings are centrally located around a large pit. Approximately 
20 acres contain the majority of the buildings and is where the 
operation occurs. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 79). In 1982 Monroe was 
aware of its responsibility to comply with the Fair Labor 
Standards Act and to pay an hourly minimum wage of $3.35 in 
applicable cases. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 113). 
In 1976 two boys sneaked onto the Monroe property, fell 
through the ice, and drowned. From that time on Monroe elected to 
hire a security person for the Cottonwood facility. (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 38) . 
In 1982 Dean Adams who had been the prior security guard 
indicated he wished to move to other endeavors. An ad was put in 
the newspaper which stated that Monroe wanted a part-time security 
guard who would live on the premises and who would provide their 
own mobile home. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 138). Defendant Sidwell 
applied for the job. She interviewed with Mr. Bruce Squires who 
at that time was the division manager of all the plants and with 
Mr. Darrell Williams who at that time was the foreman of the 
Cottonwood facility. Since a major portion of this appeal focuses 
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upon the agreement reached by the parties as to the scope of 
Defendant's work, the testimony of Squires, Williams, and the 
defendant relating to this initial employment agreement will now 
be examined. 
Bruce Squires stated that when Mrs. Sidwell contacted him he 
told her to go talk to Darrell Williams who was the foreman of the 
Cottonwood Heights plant. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 138). She came back 
several hours later and said that Darrell had hired her. At that 
point he signed her up on the payroll. (Id. at 139). 
Mr. Squires stated that Defendant was told that Monroe wanted 
her continual presence on the property. Monroe wanted someone 
coming and going so there would be tire tracks in the snow on the 
weekends and the kids would know that somebody was around. He 
stated he did not expect her to be there at all times on the 
weekend. He stated that he told Mrs. Sidwell that she was free to 
come and go as she pleased. He recalled telling her that if 
she was going to be gone for a couple of days they would like to 
know so they could call the sheriff's department and have them 
patrol the property while she was gone. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 
141-42). Mr. Squires stated that in his view of the agreement she 
had no responsibilities whenever anyone else was on the property. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 143). 
It was his original understanding that she could live there 
and was entitled to leave at night whenever she wanted to. He did 
not want to hire somebody, however, who was always going to be 
away and her semi-retired life-style appealed to him because he 
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assumed she would be present most of the time. (Id. at 144). 
Mrs. Sidwell was instructed to make "rounds" at various times 
to inspect the property. Squires admitted it was possible she 
would make those rounds even though other people were present. 
(Id. at 146). He was mostly concerned during her employment to 
have her presence on the property and to make sure she checked the 
gates to be sure they were locked at night. (Id. at 147). 
Mr. Squires examined Exhibit D-l which is entitled "Job 
Description—Security Guard". While he could not recall 
specifically going over it with Mrs. Sidwell he assumed he did 
since his handwriting appears on it. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 149-150). 
During the tenure of Mrs. Sidwell1s employment Mr. Squires 
would occasionally come to the property at various times. He 
sometimes would come early in the mornings and other times in the 
afternoons. Most of the time she was there. During one period of 
time Mr. Squires stated that he specifically asked Timmie to turn 
off pumps at 2:00 and 4:00 in the morning and she said she would 
gladly do it and actually performed this t^sk. (Id. at 153). 
Darrell Williams was the plant foreman at that time. He 
interviewed Mrs. Sidwell and outlined the job description as well 
as the type of individual they were seeking. He states that 
Exhibit 1 is the job description that he gave to her. This was 
given to her shortly after she was hired in early 1982. (Id. 
at 156-57). 
He told her that she was hired as a deterrent to vandalism. 
She was expected to show her presence and to make sure all the 
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gates were locked. (Id. at 158). Mr. Williams acknowledged that 
Mrs. Sidwell was supposed to be present on the property and was 
required to physically live there. (Id. at 167). He informed 
Mrs. Sidwell that her job was to insure that after operation hours 
had ceased she was to make sure the property was secure and that 
no kids were playing on it. She was also expected to make rounds 
on weekends and holidays. (Tr.Vol. II, pp. 21-23). 
Mr. Williams never told Defendant that she had to remain 
awake during the night to be on guard. He stated that she was 
free to come and go other than the required rounds on the 
weekends. She was free to leave between 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. 
during the week and had no responsibilities during that period of 
time at all. After 5:00 p.nu she was responsible to see that 
small children did not come on the premises. He never instructed 
Mrs. Sidwell that her duties terminated when the sun went down. 
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 27-32). 
Defendant Sidwell testified that during her initial inquiry 
she visited with Darrell Williams to determine what the exact 
duties would be if she chose to live on the Monroe property. She 
stated she took detailed notes as he explained what would be 
expected. According to Sidwell, Williams told her that she would 
be expected to be present on the property every night but that she 
should not be afraid because there would be a night crew present. 
He told her that although the night crew would be working in the 
back pit she would be expected to be present after the plant 
closed at 5:00. (Tr.Vol. II, p. 39). She was told as to the 
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nighttime duty on the weekdays that she coqld pretty well live her 
own life but that she would have to make certain rounds late in 
the evening- This could include turning pumps on and off in the 
middle of the night after the night crew had gone. (Id. at 40). 
Mr. Williams also explained that Monroe expected her to be on 
the property every weekend and every holiday while the plant was 
not in operation. He told her that weekends started at 11:45 on 
Saturday at which time she would be expected to close the top gate 
on the south. After the plant closed and the machinery had 
stopped running she was to close the bottom gate every Saturday at 
noon. This was to occur whether or not there was a maintenance 
crew on the site. (Id. at 41). Mr. Williams told her that on 
Sundays she was to make rounds three times a day (Id. at 43). 
Williams told her that she was to be on the lookout for 
trespassers at all times even when she was not making her rounds. 
She was responsible for making sure all the buildings were locked 
during the periods that the plant was not ^n operation. (Id. 
at p. 44). Were she to see any trespassers she was not to 
confront them in a violent manner but was to ask them their 
business and to take any license plate numbers down when 
applicable and report them to the police. (Id.). 
During these conversations she told Williams that she would 
have to have time during the weekend to go to the grocery store 
and sometimes to church. She also told him that she might want to 
go to the symphony or to the theater. She stated that Mr. 
Williams said this would be perfectly fine as long as she would 
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let them know. In that event she was to make sure the gates were 
locked before she left and to lock the gate behind her when she 
left and to make another round when she returned. (Id. at 45). 
She was also told that on very windy nights she was to get up and 
to go over to the cement plant and make sure that the pilot light 
of the boiler was still functioning. (Id. at 47). 
After beginning her employment she was given the "Job 
Description—Security Guard" Exhibit 1 (contained herein in the 
Appendix) by Mr. Williams. He told her that this was her formal 
job description and added that she was also required to check the 
boilers during windy days which was not contained in the exhibit. 
He again told her that during the daylight hours from 7:00 in the 
morning until 5:00 at night she was not responsible for anything 
occurring at the plant and that she could obtain a daytime job if 
she so desired. (Id. at 58) . 
It was defendant Sidwell's contention that under the terms of 
the agreement she was required to be present in her mobile home or 
on the property generally each weeknight after 5:00 p.m. when the 
plant had ceased operation. In addition, she was required to be 
on the premises from 12:00 p.m. Saturday until 7:00 a.m. Monday of 
each weekend as well as to be on the premises during any holiday. 
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 181-83). 
Between 1982 and 1986 she worked under several different 
foremans. These included Darrell Williams, Ken Bartel and Jan 
Vasey. Mrs. Sidwell maintained that as the years progressed she 
was given more and more responsibilities from the original 
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agreement. These included controlling the level of the back lake, 
making more active "rounds", and working at additional times. 
(Defendants Exhibit 6). 
After several incidents of vandalism had occurred Mrs. 
Sidwell was asked to submit her recommendations as to how to 
improve the security at the Monroe plant. On January 21, 1986 she 
submitted three documents to the management of Monroe concerning 
her proposals for additional security including additional 
compensation for her services. One document was a history of her 
experiences at the Monroe plant including the various duties she 
had been assigned throughout the years as well as an explanation 
as to certain events that had occurred. (Defendant's Exhibit 6). 
A second document submitted on this date was entitled "Some 
Informal Thoughts About Revised Security Guard Schedule". This 
document essentially made various proposals and suggestions as to 
how the security could be improved at the site. In addition, Mrs. 
Sidwell called various security companies to obtain rates for 
protection of these facilities. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 11). 
The final document submitted on Januarly 24, 1986 was entitled 
"Analysis: Estimated Dollar Value of My Present Total Work Hours." 
This document analyzed various levels of security from the level 
being provided at the time to suggested increased levels. In this 
document Mrs. Sidwell makes various proposals for increased wages 
for increased service. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 12). All three of 
these documents are contained as part of tfye Appendix herein. 
Subsequently, a letter was sent to defendant Sidwell dated 
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January 28, 1986 which terminated her services in the security 
function at the Cottonwood Heights plant. (Exhibit P-14)• A copy 
of which is contained in the Appendix herein. 
On April 25, 1986 a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed 
against Defendant alleging that her employment terminated on March 
31, 1986 but that she refused to move from the premises. (R. 
4-5). On May 5, 1986 an Answer and Counterclaim was filed 
alleging that Monroe had breached its contract by terminating her 
services wrongfully since she should have been allowed to continue 
employment until the gravel pit had been closed. (R. 8-10). 
On August 27, 1986, after a new attorney had been retained, 
an Amended Counterclaim was filed on behalf of Defendant. In this 
Counterclaim Defendant for the first time asserted her claim of 
inadequate wages under the Federal Fair Labor Standard Act. (R. 
48-54). 
As previously noted, Judgment was rendered on behalf of 
plaintiff Monroe and against Defendant as to both the Complaint 
and Counterclaim. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court erred in denying any benefits to Defendant 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. First, the court erred in 
concluding that Defendant was not required as a condition of her 
employment to essentially be present on the property during 
certain periods of time during the week. This finding is without 
adequate evidentiary support and is clearly erroneous. 
Second, the lower court incorrectly applied the principles of 
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federal employment law to the facts of this case. The court 
concluded that because Defendant had opportunity to engage in 
personal activities during her presence on Plaintiff's property 
that she automatically was not entitled to any claim of benefits. 
Under federal law, an analysis must be made of each case and there 
is no automatic exclusion merely because of personal activities. 
ARGUMENT 
Since this case was tried to the lower court, sitting without 
a jury, certain elementary principles of appellate review apply. 
First, the Findings of Fact must provide a basis for determining 
whether there is a rational basis for the court's decision. 
Proper Findings are essential to enable an appellate court to 
perform its function of assuring that the Findings support the 
Judgment and that the evidence supports the Findings. Romrell 
v. Zions Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980). 
Next, an appellate court does not accord any deference to the 
Conclusions of Law of the trial court sitting without a jury in 
reviewing such Conclusions of Law for correctness. An appellate 
court is as capable of determining a question of law as is the 
trial court and therefore is not bound by its conclusions. Wessel 
v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250 (Utah 1985). 
i i 
Findings of Fact that are conclusions bf law are treated as 
such on appeal and will stand only if there are other Findings of 
Fact sufficient to support them. Town Concrete Pipe of 
Washington, Inc. v. Redford, 717 P.2d 1384 (Wash. App. 1986). 
An appellate court must give great weight to the findings 
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made and the inference drawn by the trial judge but it must reject 
his findings if it considers them to be clearly erroneous, A 
finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to 
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); Adair v. 
Bracken, 70 Utah Adv. Rpt. 39 (Ct. App. 11-24-87). 
Applying these principles to the following case requires 
reversal. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY ADDITIONAL 
COMPENSATION FOR HER EMPLOYMENT WITH THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
The lower court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law made several erroneous findings. The erroneous Findings of 
Fact are as follows: 
Finding No. 7: Plaintiff and Defendant agreed 
that Defendant would reside on the premises, although 
it was not a condition of her employment that she be 
present on the premises on a full-time basis or 
during any certain times (except to perform some 
of her specific duties, the timing of some of which 
assignments was freely altered by Defendant from time 
to time). 
Finding No. 10: Defendant was free to come and go 
as she wished, and was free to pursue her own 
individual interests during the time she was employed 
by Plaintiff and to use her time effectively for her 
own purposes to do such things as eat, sleep, go 
shopping, do personal errands, study, write, 
occasionally attend church and the symphony, accept 
full-time employment during the day, and with the prior 
permission of the plaintiff (which was freely given and 
never denied) take evening classes at the University of 
Utah and on one occasion for two or three months accept 
full-time employment which extended until approximately 
9:00 p.m. on weekdays, and engage in other normal 
private pursuits. 
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Finding No. 11: Defendant's actual duties under 
the agreement with Plaintiff approximated no more than 
eight to ten hours per week for which she was paid by 
Plaintiff at rates in excess of the minimum wage 
required under the FLSA; and the other times when 
Defendant was living on the premises did not constitute 
hours which were controlled by the plaintiff or its 
business. 
Findings of Fact, Record, p. 195-196. (Emphasis added). 
Defendant would dispute the following Conclusions of Law 
entered by the court: 
Conclusion 4: Under 29 C.F.R. §785.23, because 
Defendant in this case was not working all the time she 
was on the plaintiff's premises, and because Defendant 
was free to engage in normal private pursuits and had 
time for eating, sleeping, entertaining, and other 
periods of complete freedom from all duties when she 
was free to come and go for purposes of her own, 
Defendant's actual hours at work did not exceed the 
number which, when her compensation was taken into 
account, would have constituted a violation of the 
minimum wage or overtime provision of the FLSA. 
Conclusion 5: Plaintiff did not violate the terms 
of the FLSA with respect to the minimum wage and 
overtime requirements of said Act. 
Conclusion 6: Defendant is not entitled under the 
FLSA to be paid for those times which she was able to 
use effectively for her own purposes and during which 
she was free to come and go as she pleased and was free 
to pursue her own personal interests. 
Conclusion 7: Defendant is not entitled to any 
further compensation from Plaintiff either under the 
minimum wage provision or the overtime provisions of 
the FLSA. 
Conclusions of Law, R. 197-198. (Emphasis added). 
These Findings and Conclusions are erroneous for the 
following two reasons. First, the clear weight of the evidence 
shows that Defendant Sidwell was in fact required to be physically 
present at the property during certain specified hours during the 
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week. Second, while during those hours she was free to engage in 
personal activity at the jobsite her mere presence on the property 
was a benefit to Monroe and, in addition, she performed services 
as needed throughout the night and weekend. Federal law permits 
compensation under these circumstances. 
A. Defendant Sidwell was Required to be on 
Plaintiff's Property During Certain Specified 
Hours of Each Week. 
It is undisputed that Plaintiff Monroe is subject to the Fair 
Labor Standards Act because it is engaged in interstate commerce 
and because it has a yearly gross sales of at least $250,000. It 
is also uncontested that regardless the type of agreement entered 
into between Plaintiff and Defendant in February of 1982, such 
agreement cannot change the requirements of the Federal Labor law. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 29). An agreement between an employer and an 
employee which is in violation of the federal wage laws is of no 
force and effect and cannot constitute a waiver. Mitchell v. 
Turner, 286 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1960); 29 C.F.R. §785.8. 
In determining whether hours are compensable it is the duty 
of a court to look to the employment agreement to determine what 
the parties intended, and where that is impossible to look to the 
circumstances to determine what was intended. See, Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 232 U.S. 134 (1944); Rural Fire Protection Co. v. 
Hepp, 366 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1966). "The law does not impose an 
arrangement upon the parties. It imposes upon the courts the task 
of finding what the arrangement was." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 326 
U.S. at 137. 
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The United States Supreme Court in Skidmore made other 
pertinent observations- The court noted, for example, that often 
parties to an employment arrangement do not anticipate the 
problems which arise from lack of clear definition of employment 
duties• Nevertheless, the Supreme Court stated: 
We do not minimize the difficulty of such an 
inquiry where the arrangements of the parties have not 
contemplated the problem posed by the statute- But it 
does not differ in nature or in the standards to guide 
judgment from that which frequently confronts courts 
where they must find retrospectively %he effect of 
contracts as to matters which the parties failed to 
anticipate or explicitly to provide f6r. Id- at 
137. 
With these principles in mind it now remains to examine the 
facts of this case. 
At the time the employment arrangement was entered into by 
the parties, neither contemplated a claim under the Federal Labor 
Standard Act. Mrs. Sidwell was content with her compensation of 
$350 a month and Monroe was content with its explanation of 
services to be rendered. Had the parties contemplated this type 
of an action undoubtedly additional steps would have been taken by 
one, the other, or both to clarify the actual working arrangement-
This failure to clarify, however, has absolutely no effect upon 
the application of the federal statute to the circumstances of 
this case. 
It is undisputed that at the time the arrangement was entered 
into Mrs. Sidwell would have certain responsibilities. First, she 
was required to live at the Monroe Cement felant site- Second, she 
was required to perform certain specified junctions such as 
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checking and locking gates and making "rounds" during certain 
periods of time to insure the safety of the property. Third, Mrs. 
Sidwell was paid a monthly wage of $355 with no attempt made by 
Monroe to maintain any computation of hours actually worked. 
It is also essentially undisputed that the "active" time 
spent by Mrs. Sidwell in her patrolling, locking of gates, and 
writing reports encompassed approximately eight hours a week. 
(Exhibit 12). Thus, were the only question in this case whether 
Monroe had compensated Mrs. Sidwell for her active work under the 
Federal guidelines there would be no question but that it had. 
The dispute in this litigation, therefore, focuses upon the 
claim of Mrs. Sidwell that not only did she have certain "active" 
duties to perform each day but that she was also "passively" 
required to be present at the site during specified periods of 
time. Defendant asserted that she was required by Monroe to be 
physically present at the property during the weekday nights after 
the operation of the plant had ceased. In addition, she was 
required to be physically present at the site on Saturday from 
12:00 until 7:00 Monday morning. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 181-83). She 
claimed that while she was permitted to leave the premises for 
certain short periods of time with prior permission of Monroe that 
she was not free to leave the premises for any activities she 
desired. 
Monroe, on the other hand, asserted that there was no set 
requirement that she be present at the property during any certain 
number of hours and that she essentially was free to come and go 
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as she wanted at any time. The lower courtt accepted this version 
of the facts and found, as previously noted, that there was no set 
requirement of her presence. 
Appellant submits that the conclusion of the lower court is 
erroneous when the entire record is examined in detail. A review 
of the record is as follows. 
First, Mrs. Sidwell testified that wt^ en she met with Darrell 
Williams during the initial job interview he told her that she 
would be expected to be present on the property every night. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 39). He also informed her that she would be expected 
to be on the property during the weekends and during holidays. 
(Id. at 41) . 
At that time she informed him that she may have to go to the 
grocery store, to church, and to the symphony and that she could 
not guarantee she would always be present during every hour of 
these periods of time. She stated that Mr. Williams said this was 
perfectly fine as long as she contacted Monroe officials and 
informed them that she would be absent for a short period. (Id. 
at 45). This account was directly denied by Mr. Williams, a 
present Monroe employee, who stated he never told her she was 
restricted from leaving the premises at an^ time. (Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 243). 
All things being equal, therefore, the lower court could 
choose to believe Mr. Williams' testimony and discard the 
testimony of Mrs. Sidwell. Under Williams* version she was free 
to do whatever she wanted whenever she wanted as long as she 
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performed certain minimal duties such as locking the gates and 
making a round of the premises. However, if that was the case 
then why was it necessary for her to periodically discuss with him 
her absence to go to church, run errands, attend the symphony, and 
the theater. 
Mr. Stanton Wilson who is the vice president of Monroe 
testified that it was his understanding from the original 
agreement that Mrs. Sidwell would be allowed to attend church on 
Sunday morning, that she could go to the symphony occasionally if 
she so desired, and that she would have further leeway for theater 
activities. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 52-54). This testimony emphasizes 
the patent inconsistency to approve specific activities of Mris 
Sidwell if in fact she was always free to do anything she chose. 
Next, is the job description which was given to Mrs. Sidwell. 
Mr. Squires who was then the district manager stated that at some 
time immediately after hiring her he reviewed the job description 
of a security guard with her and even wrote additional comments on 
it. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 156-57; Exhibit 1). Darrell Williams, the 
foreman at the jobsite, also acknowledged that he went over the 
job description with her at the time she was hired. Finally, Mrs. 
Sidwell stated that she was given the job description contained in 
Exhibit 1 and told that this was her responsibility. (Tr. Vol. 
II, pp. 55-57) . 
Exhibit 1 states that the responsibility of a security guard 
is: 
Security and prevention of vandalism to buildings, 
plants, equipment, supplies and property. He is 
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directly responsible after operating hours of each 
division, weekends and holidays (except designated days 
off). (Exhibit 1). 
While an attempt was made by Monroe during the trial to imply 
that "operating hours" are when the last person of the maintenance 
crew left for the night the clear substance of the evidence showed 
that operating hours were when the plant closed for its normal 
operation regardless of whether a maintenance crew was still on 
the premises. Mr, Williams, for example, stated that the plant 
was in operation from 7:00 in the morning until 5:00 or 6:00 at 
night. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 159). He stated that the plant could only 
operate during these hours since people who lived around the area 
would otherwise complain about the noise. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 14). 
Likewise, Jan Vasey who was the third foreman who supervised 
Defendant, testified that the plant normally shut down at 5:00 
p.m. and would open at 7:00 a.m. On Saturday, it would shut down 
around noon. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 258). 
Mr. Williams, also supported Defendant's contention that she 
was required to be present on the property after 5:00 p.m. He 
stated that Mrs. Sidwell was free to leave the premises and to do 
whatever she wanted between 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. and had no 
responsibilities during that period of time|. However, after 5:00 
p.m. she was responsible to see that small children did not come 
on the premises. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 30). 
Additional evidence supports Defendant's version of the 
requirement of the job. Mrs. Sidwell testified that Doug Clark, 
one of the top management officials of Monroe, drove out to see 
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her in the summer of 1984. At that time she stated Mr. Clark 
stressed the fact that her responsibility was to definitely be 
present at nights and on weekends. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 64). Mr. 
Clark was not called as a witness by Monroe to refute this 
statement. 
The two most compelling reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's 
claim that Defendant was free to come and go at her leisure are 
(1) the testimony of Jan Vasey stating that she frequently called 
him for permission to leave; and (2) her own report to the company 
in January of 1986 prior to any time she was asserting a claim for 
additional wages. 
If, as stated by Plaintiff Mrs. Sidwell was free to come and 
go as she wanted and only had certain specified duties which could 
be performed virtually at any time why was it necessary for her to 
contact the foremen and inform them of her absence. Mr. Vasey 
answered the following questions posed to him by Defendant's 
attorney: 
Q. Did Mrs. Sidwell occasionally call you to ask 
to be absent from the premises of Monroe? 
A. Yes, she did. 
Q. Did you keep any records of those? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Can you tell me how often she called you to be 
off the premises? 
A. Not very often. 
Q. Okay. Do you remember the type of time off she 
would ask for? 
A. Usually a couple of hours here, a couple of hours 
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there. 
Q. Was that generally approved? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did she ask for permission to attend school? 
A. Yes, she did. 
Q. Did you give her that permission? 
A. Yes I did. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 260). 
The court was obviously concerned abo^t his inconsistency and 
therefore asked several questions of Mr. Vasey. The dialogue 
between the court and Mr. Vasey is as follows: 
THE COURT: I have a question, Mr. Vasey. You say that 
occassionally she would call you and ask if she could 
take time off, like to go to school and so forth? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Well, didn't that seem odd to you if she 
didn't have to, if she could be there any time anyway, 
she wasn't required to be there any particular time? 
THE WITNESS: I don't understand what you are trying to 
say. 
THE COURT: Well, did you expect her to be there any 
certain hours? 
THE WITNESS: No, I did not. 
THE COURT: Well, why did she call to ^sk if she could 
go to school? 
THE WITNESS: I guess she figured she needed the 
permission to go. 
THE COURT: And--* * * 
THE COURT: Well, didn't you say anything to her, like, 
why are you calling me? What difference does it make? 
You can do whatever you want. 
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THE WITNESS: No, I did not. 
THE COURT: Like what did you say when she would ask you 
these things? 
THE WITNESS: I would just tell her she was free to go. 
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 264-65). 
It seems inconceivable that a foreman such as Mr. Vasey would 
merely humor the defendant by giving her permission to go away 
from the premises if such permission was not in fact required. 
This conduct, if for no other reason, would certainly give rise to 
Defendant's claim that she sincerely believed she was required to 
stay on the premises after operating hours unless she expressly 
obtained permissionto leave for specific reasons. 
It is elementary that the conduct of the parties to a 
contract is substantial evidence as to the meaning of that 
contract. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 232 U.S. 134 (1944). This 
admission by Plaintiff's employee that he "gave permission" for 
Defendant to leave, together with the prior statements of Mr. 
Stanton Wilson that the parties contemplated she could leave for 
certain specified reasons such as school, the symphony, and church 
completely negates the conclusion that she was always free to go 
wherever she wanted at any time. 
On January 24 Mrs. Sidwell submitted three documents to the 
management of Monroe at a time when tensions had been created over 
her claim that she was not receiving sufficient compensation for 
the work she was doing and Monroe's claim that she was not 
properly performing her duties. At this time Mrs. Sidwell was 
clearly not aware of any federal wage guidelines and was not 
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attempting to document this litigation sinqe she had not even been 
terminated by Monroe. Rather, her attempt was to work out an 
arrangement where she would receive what she believed to be fair 
compensation for her efforts and to increase the security 
arrangements of the plant. 
Exhibit 6 succinctly describes the agreement she entered into 
in February of 1982. She stated: 
Because of a recent case of vandalism, I want to 
put before you a history of my functions at Monroe 
since February 8, 1982. I was hired by Darrell 
Williams to perform the following functions: 
(1) To be here nights and weekends, and 
holidays (Christmas, Labor Day, etc.) with 
weekends specified by Darrell as Saturday 
afternoons only, and all day Sunday. 
(2) To lock gates. 
(3) To keep a lookout for trespassers 
and to make the following rounds at weekends: 
MORNINGS, possible NOONS, and EVENINGS, on 
Sundays, holidays and only when hight crews 
or Monroe personnel were not on location. 
In Exhibit 12, her "analysis of estimated dollar value of her 
present total work hours," she again described her present job 
description. She broke each function of heir job into categories 
as follows: 
Category (A): To be present on location each night 
of the week. 
Category (B): To be present on location (1) 
Saturday afternoons (or whenever men are not working, 
and no one is there); (2) all day Sunday; (3) on 
specified holidays. 
Category (C): To lock the gates each night, first 
checking that everyone has left the plant. 
Category (D): To make rounds three times per day, 
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maximum, on days designated in (B) above. To evict 
trespassers and to make reports on the activity to the 
plant foreman after any incidents. 
Category (E): Presumption: that the guard lives on 
premises. 
Defendant then concluded that during each week she was 
passively located on the property for 104-1/2 hours. (Exhibit 12, 
p. 2). The active work requiring to lock the gates, make the 
rounds, and make reports she calculated at 7 hours and 50 
minutes. 
She then stated the following which now supports her 
contention she was required to be physically on the premises. 
This type of analysis is useless unless the 
alternatives are kept well in mind: in my case, the 
alternative presented is that, as an autonomous human 
being, I maintain the choice to be away from home some 
nights, sometimes overnight and some weekends; to go to 
the mountains some Sundays. 
When I took on the job of security guard, I was 
aware that this would be curtailed, and I made the 
choices accordingly. However, for this very reason, it 
is presumed that my presence on location has some 
financial value, even at times when I am not physically 
working, or making rounds. 
(Exhibit 12, pp. 2-3). 
The finding by the lower court that Defendant was not 
required to be present on the site during the evenings and 
weekends but was free to come and go as she pleased is clearly 
erroneous. Although there is evidence to support it (the 
assertions of the Monroe employees during trial) a review of the 
entire record together with the actions of the parties shows with 
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. 
This Court, therefore, based upon the record should find that as 
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part of Defendant's job responsibilities stie was required to 
remain on the premises after operating hours unless she obtained 
prior approval of Monroe to leave. 
B. The Lower Court Incorrectly Applied Federal 
Wage Law to the Facts of this Ca4e. 
The court concluded that because the defendant was "not 
working all the time that she was on the plaintiff's premises" and 
"because she was free to engage in normal private pursuits" and 
was "free to come and go for purposes of h$r own" she was not 
subject to the FSLA requirement of minimum wages. 
Defendant readily admits that the application of federal wage 
law to situations such as this is difficulty at best. Where an 
employee goes to an employer's job site and works in actual 
physical labor for a specified period of time and then leaves the 
job site for the day, there is no difficulty in applying the wage 
laws to benefits that employee is entitled to receive. When, on 
the other hand, an employee lives on the working site or does not 
physically perform work during an entire period of time that he is 
present, the situation becomes much more complex. 
29 C.F.R. §785.7 relates to judicial Construction of these 
type of cases. Essentially this regulation relates that the 
United States Supreme Court originally held that employees subject 
to the Act must be paid for all time spent in "physical or mental 
exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the 
employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of 
the employer or his business." Tennessee Cqal, Iron and 
Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944). 
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The regulation notes, however, that later the Court ruled 
that there need be no exertion at all and that all hours are hours 
worked which the employee is required to give his employer, that 
"an employee, if he chooses, may hire a man to do nothing, or to 
do nothing but wait for something to happen,. Refraining from 
other activity often is a factor of instant readiness to serve, 
and idleness plays a part in all employments in a stand-by 
capacity. Readiness to serve may be hired, quite as much as 
service itself, and time spent lying in wait for threats to the 
safety of the employer's property may be treated by the parties as 
a benefit to the employer." [Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 
U.S. 126 (1944); Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944)]. 
Whether waiting time is time worked depends upon the 
particular circumstances of each case. This determination 
involves "scrutiny and construction of the agreement between 
particular parties, appraisal of their practical construction of 
the working agreement by conduct, consideration of the nature of 
the service, and its relation to the waiting time and all of the 
circumstances. Facts may show that the employee was engaged to 
wait, or they may show that he waited to be engaged." Skidmore 
v- Swift, 323 U.S. 134 at 137. 
29 C.F.R. §785.16 again attempts to give guidelines in 
determining whether waiting time is or is not compensable. It 
states: 
Periods during which an employee is completely 
relieved from duty and which are long enough to enable 
him to use the time effectively for his own purposes 
are not hours worked. He is not completely relieved 
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from duty and cannot use the time effectively for his 
own purposes unless he is definitely told in advance 
that he may leave the job and that he will not have to 
commence work until a definitely specified hour has 
arrived. Whether the time is long enough to enable him 
to use the time effectively for his own purposes 
depends upon all the facts and circum$tances of the 
case. 
29 C.F.R. §785.17 concerns employees Who are "on call". It 
states: 
An employee who is required to remain on call on 
the employerfs premises or so close thereto that he 
cannot use the time effectively for his own purposes is 
working while "on call". An employee who is not 
required to remain on the employer's premises but is 
merely required to leave word at his home or with 
company officials where he may be reached is not 
working while on call. [Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 
323 U.S. 126 (1944); Handler v. Thrasher, 191 F.2d 
120 (C.A. 10, 1951); Walling v. Bank of Waynesboro, 
Georgia, 61 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Ga. 1945)]. 
The preceding discussions concern the concept of "waiting 
time". Appellant asserted that Mrs. Sidwell was required to stay 
on the property in order that vandalism ma^ f be deterred and, in 
addition, to perform certain functions wherj. required such as 
turning on pumps or operating other types of machinery. It is 
unnecessary at this point in the proceedings to detail the 
evidence to support her claim that she frequently was asked by 
telephone to perform functions at the plant during the 
non-operating hours. Since the lower court did not address the 
concept of waiting time and made no findings to that effect a 
remand is required to determine whether Defendant's mere presence 
at the jobsite or her ability to perform operational functions at 
the plant could be considered compensable time under the Act. 
The court addressed its decision solely upon 29 C.F.R. 
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§785.23 which is entitled "Employees Residing on Employer's 
Premises or Working at Home." This regulation acknowledges that 
an employee who resides on the premises cannot make a claim for 
all time there and that those times in which the person engages in 
normal activities in which there is "complete freedom from all 
duties when he may leave the premises for purposes of his own" are 
not compensable. The regulation continues by noting that it is 
difficult to determine these hours and that any "reasonable 
agreement of the parties which takes into consideration all the 
pertinent facts will be accepted." 
Defendant Sidwell maintained that she was free to do whatever 
she wanted from 7:00 in the morning until 5:00 p.m. each weeknight 
and from 7:00 a.m. until 12:00 noon on Saturday. She made no 
claim for these periods. After this period, however, she asserted 
that she was required to be physically present at the site unless 
she had been excused for a specific activity. 
The lower court rejected this contention and, as previously 
noted, found that she could leave at any time during each 24-hour 
period. Based upon this finding it concluded that none of the 
time in which she resided on the premises was compensable since 
she had "complete freedom from all duties" and could "leave the 
premises for purposes of her own." 
Since the lower court based its conclusion on an erroneous 
factual finding it did not properly analyze the question. Section 
785.23 must be considered with §785.21 and §785.22 which concern 
duty of less than 24 hours and duty of 24 hours or more. Under 
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these regulations, it is quite clear that sleep time can be work 
time. For periods of less than 24 hours the rule is that sleep 
time is work time. For 24 hour periods, there must be an 
agreement and the employer must furnish sleeping facilities. No 
more than eight hours can be excluded. If there is no agreement 
the eight hours must be included as hours forked. 
In situations where an employee resides on the employer's 
property the courts have gone in both directions as to granting or 
denying compensation. For example, in Witt v. Skelly Oil 
Co., 379 P.2d 61 (N.M. 1963) a utility man occupied a residence 
on his employer's premises and his duties required him to remain 
available on the premises during weekends. The court held he was 
entitled to be compensated for all hours which he spent in a 
stand-by status except for those hours devoted to eating and 
sleeping and performing personal work. 
In Crago v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 301 F. Supp. 743 (D. Tenn. 
1969) the plaintiff was employed as a caretaker of a test station 
facility and was hired to remain on the premises. The court in 
that case apportioned a segment of the hours as working time and 
rejected the rest. The court stated: 
Although plaintiff was a captive on defendant's 
premises for sixteen unpaid hours of the day, we think 
that it would be unreasonable to hold that all, or 
most, of that time was time worked for purposes of the 
Act. Eight of those hours were spent by plaintiff 
sleeping and two were spent eating. Also, plaintiff 
had a wife and children who lived with him on the 
premises. 
In our opinion, three of the remaining six hours 
of the day were spent by plaintiff in pursuit of purely 
personal matters as distinguished from the performance 
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of his duty to act as caretaker of defendant's test 
station. 
Although plaintiff spent only a brief period in 
overtime each day in actual physical labor, such as 
turning lights on and off, this fact is not controlling 
as to the determination of the hours worked by 
plaintiff for purposes of the Fair Labor Standard Act. 
We find that, in the circumstances of this case, 
plaintiff was hired to serve and to be ready to serve 
and that he did so serve for eleven hours a day. Since 
he was paid for only eight of those hours he must be 
compensated for the other three under the terms of the 
Act. IcL_ at 747. 
In Whitsitt v. Enid Ice & Fuel Co., 6 CCH Lab Cas para. 
61226 (D. Okla. 1942) the court held that in as much as a night 
watchman was employed to remain at the plant, all the hours 
between the plant shutdown time and 6:00 a.m. were working hours, 
even though he had the privilege of and was furnished facilities 
for sleeping. 
Respondent will undoubtedly be able to cite other cases to 
the contrary which hold that such time is not compensable. 
See, e.g. Adkins v. Campbell, Brown & Co., 189 F. Supp. 
553 (D. Va. 1960); Shupe v. Day, 113 F. Supp. 949 (D. Va. 
1953) . Each of these cases turns upon the peculiar facts and 
circumstances of employment. No sweeping generalizations can be 
made. 
In the instant case, the activities of Defendant during her 
nighttime and weekend hours in which she was not actively 
performing a duty was never examined. Monroe maintained no 
records whatsoever concerning Sidwell's employment. As such, a 
court must determine what wages are owing by reasonable inference 
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from the facts presented. In Marshall v. I^auta-Crete, Ltd., 
82 Labor Law Rpts. para. 33-589 (D. Va. 1977) two night watchmen 
made a claim for overtime pay. The court tiound that they were on 
duty each weekend from Friday afternoon until Monday morning and 
that their duties required them to lock the doors, check for 
unusual noises, and to call the police if tihey heard anyone trying 
to break in. They were allowed to sleep ar}d a cot was provided 
for them in the building. 
Since there were no records of actual time consumed, the 
court concluded that eight hours of the time was used in personal 
pursuits such as eating and sleeping and that the remainder of the 
time was attributable to the employer even though the watchmen 
were essentially performing no physical activity. 
There is no evidence in the record at this time as to what 
Defendant did during these passive hours. It may well be, for 
example, that since she had the entire morning and afternoon with 
no responsibilities whatsoever she may well have slept during 
those days and stayed up at night working on her own projects as 
well as being alert for trespassers or other occurrences at the 
plant. It cannot be assumed, therefore, that each night Mrs. 
Sidwell would have consumed nine hours of sleep. 
It is unnecessary to discus further the problems involved in 
this trial. Since the lower court determined as a factual finding 
that Mrs. Sidwell was not required to be passively present at the 
job site during the hours she claimed, the decision is fatally 
flawed. In a remand hearing the court can determine what benefit, 
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if any, Monroe received from her presence at the site and can also 
fairly determine the personal gain she received during these 
periods of time which did not go to the advantage of Monroe. 
Other questions, such as the good faith of Monroe in failing to 
pay her the minimum wage can also be examined. The award of 
attorneys' fees and liquidated damages would then be determined 
based upon these findings. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Sidwell worked at the Monroe plant for over four 
years. During this time she clearly performed valuable services 
in the prevention of vandalism and in performing certain tasks 
which were required for the operation such as lighting boilers and 
turning on pumps. It is unfortunate that a clear agreement was 
not entered into between the parties at the time but, on the other 
hand, this is not fatal. The conduct of the parties including 
their actions and their perceptions of the agreement must be 
utilized in construing the terms of the agreement. 
The evidence is overwhelming that Mrs. Sidwell was in fact 
required to be present at the site during non-operating hours 
unless she had been specifically given permission to leave for 
certain activities. The mere fact that the employer required her 
to be there can give rise to a claim for compensation even if she 
performed no duties whatsoever. The loss of freedom and ability 
to do one's own activities is compensable under certain 
circumstances. 
The lower court made no analysis of the waiting time, or 
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on-call concepts of employment arrangements. The court focused 
entirely upon the section dealing with "residing employees". The 
court failed to make inquiries as to the activities Mrs. Sidwell 
performed, to the benefit which her presence at the site created, 
and to the detriment of Mrs. Sidwell in being unable to have the 
freedom of movement. 
An analogy is helpful here. A person going on a two-week 
vacation may choose to hire a "house sitter" to live in their 
house during their absence. The house sitter normally goes about 
their own business and even gains benefits from being able to use 
the facilities of the house. Even so, the house sitter charges a 
fee for this service since he is conferring a benefit on the owner 
to protect the house. Even if the house sitter attends a 
two-hour play at night the benefit still exists because of the 
presence of activity in the house. 
She is entitled to a proper inquiry so that all of the facts 
and circumstances giving rise to her employment may be properly 
examined in light of the applicable standards of federal 
employment law. 
For this reason, therefore, the decision of the lower court 
should be reversed and the case remanded. 
Dated this 25th day of January, 1988. 
JOMJA 3. UJ 
Craig S/ /Cook 
Attorney^for Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
W. Matthew Warnock (4939) 
MANGUM & HOLT 
Attorneys for Defendant 
844 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-0100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
MONROC, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TIMMIE M. SIDWELL, 
Defendant. 
I NOTICE OP APPEAL 
Civil No. C-86-4757 
i Judge Scott Daniels 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules 
of Appelate Procedure, that the defendant M. Timmie Sidwell will 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court that portion of the final 
Judgment entered on or about March 20, 1987 in the above-
captioned court and case, which denied relief in defendant's 
counterclaims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, together with 
all Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L*w related thereto. 
DATED this 17th day of April, 1987. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAIM NO 
On this 17th day of April, 198 
States Mall, postage prepaid a true 
foregoing Notice of Appeal to: 
John Paul Kennedy 
1385 Yale Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
, I deposited in the United 
and correct copy of the 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
MONROC, INC., } 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TIMMIE M. SIDWELL, 
Defendant. 
| FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
I CIVIL NO. C 86 4757 
1 JUDGE DANIELS 
This matter came on for trial on March 2 and 3f 1987, with 
the plaintiff represented by John Paul Kennedy and the defendant 
represented by John R. Merkling and W. Matthew Warnock. The 
Court having heard the evidence submitted by the parties and 
having considered the written and oral arguments of counsel, and 
the Court having carefully considered the evidence and the law 
applicable thereto, the Court now enters the following FINDINGS 
OP FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to the Utah 
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer Act, §§78-36-1 to 12.6, Utah 
Code Annotated. Defendant answered and asserted by way of 
counterclaim causes of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (hereinafter, the "FLSA"). 
2. At the time of the commencement of the action herein, 
plaintiff was a Delaware corporation doing business in Utah and 
Idaho, with places of business in Salt Lake County, Utah, among 
other places. 
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3. Since at least January, 1982, plaintiff's yearly gross 
sales has exceeded $250,000. 
4. Defendant, M. Timmie Sidwell, is an individual who was 
employed by plaintiff as a security person at the plaintiff's 
Cottonwood Heights sand and gravel location in Salt Lake County 
from February 8, 1982, through March 31, 1986. 
5. When defendant was hired, the plaintiff and defendant 
agreed that she would be paid $355 per month and would live in a 
mobile home located on the premises in a space provided by the 
plaintiff with utilities (gas, electricity, water, and septic 
tank) furnished by the employer as further consideration for her 
services; it was understood that defendant would either rent or 
buy the mobile home in which she lived. 
6. In addition to residing on the premises, the purpose of 
which was to provide a presence to discourage and deter 
trespassers, defendant was also assigned certain specific duties 
which included ensuring that the gates to the property were 
locked, making one limited round each week-day and an additional 
two rounds on weekends and holidays, preparing periodic reports, 
and occasionally performing other minor miscellaneous functions 
(including turning a pump switch on, and checking a pilot light 
on windy days) if she were available to do so; defendant had no 
other specific duties after daylight hours or when other Monroe 
personnel were on the premises; other than her rounds, defendant 
was not expected to keep any regular watch or surveillance over 
the property but was merely asked to report any trespassing or 
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vandalism which should happen to come to her attention. 
7. Plaintiff and defendant agreed that defendant would 
reside on the premises, although it was not a condition of her 
employment that she be present on the premises on a full-time 
basis or during any certain times (except to perform some of her 
specific duties, the timing of some of which assignments was 
freely altered by defendant from time to time). 
8. On one occasion when defendant was absent from the 
premises for several days, she arranged at her own expense to 
have a another person live in the mobile home while she was away, 
but there was no showing that the duties of the other person were 
any different from those of defendant during said period. 
9. On the occasion referred to in Finding 8, defendants 
regular salary was paid without reduction. 
10. Defendant was free to come and go as she wished, and 
was free to pursue her own individual interests during the time 
she was employed by plaintiff and to use her time effectively for 
her own purposes to do such things as eat, sleep, go shopping, do 
personal errands, study, write, occasionally attend church and 
the Symphony, accept full-time employment during the day, and, 
with the prior permission of the plaintiff (which was freely 
given and never denied), take evening classes at the University 
of Utah and on one occasion for two or three months accept full-
time employment which extended until approximately 9:00 p.m. on 
week days, and engage in other normal private pursuits. 
11. Defendant's actual duties under the agreement with 
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plaintiff approximated no more than eight to ten hours per week 
for which she was paid by plaintiff at rates in excess of the 
minimum wage required under the FLSA; and the other times when 
defendant was living on the premises did not constitute hours 
which were controlled by the plaintiff or its business. 
12. Under all of the circumstances of this case, the 
plaintiff paid the defendant for her hours of work at a rate 
which at all times exceeded the minimum rate required by the 
FLSA. 
13. Plaintiff and its representatives did not act in 
careless disregard of the minimum wage or overtime compensation 
provisions of the FLSA and did not intentionally, knowingly, or 
voluntarily take any action which violated the minimum wage or 
overtime compensation provisions of the FLSA. 
14. Plaintiff's representatives acted in good faith without 
being cognizant of any possible violation of the minimum wage or 
overtime compensation provisions of the FLSA. 
15. Defendant's employment was terminated by notice dated 
January 28, 1986, to be effective March 31, 1986, said notice 
requesting that she vacate the premises by the end of March, 
1986. 
16. When defendant failed to vacate by the stated date, 
plaintiff caused that a notice to quit be served upon her which 
was done on April 17, 1986. 
17. The complaint in this action was filed on April 25, 
4 
1986, but defendant's mobile home was not removed from 
plaintiff's property until October 30, 198$. 
18. The damages thus incurred by plaintiff total $300.00, 
computed by multiplying the reasonable rental value of the 
mobile home space (which the Court finds, after considering all 
the evidence, to be $50.00 per month) times six months. 
19. Plaintiff offered evidence that in addition to the 
reasonable rental value of the mobile home space, the average 
monthly value of utilities provided for defendant were gas: $30; 
electricity: $25; water $8; and sewer: $10. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is an enterprise doing business in interstate 
commerce and subject to the minimum wage and overtime provisions 
of the FLSA. 
2. The plaintiff lawfully terminated the employment of the 
defendant. 
3. The credible evidence offered at trial fails to prove 
any cause of action against plaintiff regarding defendant's FLSA 
claims and other claims as asserted in her amended counterclaim. 
4. Under 29 C.F.R. §785.23, because defendant in this case 
was not working all the time she was on the plaintiff's premises, 
and because defendant was free to engage in normal private 
pursuits and had time for eating, sleeping, entertaining, and 
other periods of complete freedom from all duties when she was 
free to come and go for purposes of her own, defendant's actual 
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hours of work did not exceed the number which, when her 
compensation was taken into account, would have constituted a 
violation of the minimum wage or overtime provisions of the PLSA. 
5. Plaintiff did not violate the terms of the FLSA with 
respect to the minimum wage and overtime requirements of said 
act. 
6. Defendant is not entitled under the FLSA to be paid for 
those times which she was able to use effectively for her own 
purposes and during which she was free to come and go as she 
pleased and was free to pursue her own personal interests. 
7. Defendant is not entitled to any further compensation 
from plaintiff either under the minimum wage provisions or the 
overtime provisions of the FLSA. 
8. Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment dismissing all 
counts of the amended counterclaim. 
9. The plaintiff is not entitled under the Utah Forcible 
Entry and Unlawful Detainer Act to have its damages trebled. 
10. The defendant is liable to plaintiff for the damage 
incurred by plaintiff as a result of defendant's failure to 
remove her mobile home after the notice to quit was served. 
11. Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against the 
defendant in the amount of $300.00 plus interest from September 
30, 1986, plus costs of suit. 
Dated: 
Scott Daniels, District Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MONROC, INC., ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
TIMMIE M. SIDWELL, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
\ CIVIL NO. C 86 4757 
1 JUDGE DANIELS 
The Court having entered FINDINGS OP FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW in this action, and based upon those FINDINGS and CONCLUSIONS 
now enters the following JUDGMENT: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff and against 
defendant in the amount of $300.00. 
2. Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff and against 
defendant on each count of the defendant's counterclaim, and said 
counterclaim is hereby dismissed with prejudice with no cause of 
action. 
3. Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the amount of this 
Judgment at the prejudgment rate from September 30, 1986, to the 
date hereof, and at the post-judgment rate hereafter. 
4. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendant all 
costs of suit expended by plaintiff in this action. 
Dated: 
Scott Daniels, District Judge 
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Judgment 
Approved as to form: 
2'****? 
Paul Kennedy _ 
prney for Plaintiff 
John Re Merkling and 
W, Matthew Warnock, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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.WB DFSr.RIPTION - SECURITY GUARDS 
I. BASIC FUNCTION 
Monroe's Security Guards are responsible for security of Monroe's 
designated properties. 
II. AUTHORITY 
Security Guards derive their authority from and are responsible to 
sand and gravel division manager or his designated subordinates. 
III. RESPONSIBILITY 
1. Security and prevention of vandalism to buildings, plants, 
equipment, supplies and property. He is directly respon-
sible after operating hours of each division, weekends and hol-
idays (except designated days off). 
2. He will challenge anyone entering properties during the above 
mentioned hours. He will reoort any attempted vandalism 
or theft of property to designated persons listed at end of 
job description. 
3. No one is to be allowed on properties unless by satisfactory 
identification or authority or by previous arrangement from 
Monroe's management or suoervisors'. 
4. He will record on quard loo book those persons without proper 
or questionable authority desiring entrance to oroperties. 
Log should show following: 
a. Name of individual 
b. Reason for entrance 
c. Car license number 
d. Time in and time out 
5. Under no condition will he physically try to remove any person 
from said properties. He will call for assistance from Sheriff's 
Department. 
6. He will not carry any arms, knives, etc., wheh challenqing anyone. 
His sole responsibility will be to contact Police and Sheriff's 
Department when conditions arise that require their assistance. 
7. He will be responsible for reportinq fires, electrical explosions, 
etc., to County fire departments and designated Monroe persons. He 
will take necessary efforts to prevent soreadinn of fire or "further 
damage until arrival of Fire Department 
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8. Children w i l l not be allowed on property, or playing on equipment, 
sand and gravel banks or wading, swimming in any water areas. 
9. When addit ional time o f f i s required (emergencies, e tc . ) he w i l l 
request same from designated subordinates. A l l addit ional time 
o f f should be approved before leaving property. 
10. No equipment, t oo l s , t i r e s , e t c . , w i l l be allowed to be removed 
from property without p r i o r wr i t ten clearance from Monroe's 
supervisors. 
11. Suf f i c ien t inspections should be made during the previous men-
tioned hours and days to observe and check secur i ty of bu i ld ings , 
equipment and propert ies. 
12. A l l personal grievances or complaints should be reported to sand 
and gravel d iv is ion manager. 
Douglas R. r/lark - Sand and Gravel Manager - 2 7 7 - 0 ^ 
Area supervisors and subordinates: -
Leon VanDyke - Cottonwood Heights Plant - 266-7264 
Ready Mix J t r t v x « X \ C v ; :•: <JV/? ^J •/&** 
Boi ler - Kearns - Russ CoMins - 272-2056 L J 
Boi ler - Cottonv/ood Heights - Tage Lanng - 484-1265 
Any other problems ready mix related c a l l : -
Ken Baird - 277-5478 
Keith Rudy - 363-4077 
Robert Gudmundsen - 277-4491 r 
IM! 
P« 
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fAMD 
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PHONE NUMBERS: « 
O 
FIRE DEPARTMENT . 
SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
* < f ? v 
January 24, 1986, 
first drafted and 
submitted January 
21 , 1986, for Mr. 
Stan Wilson and Mr. 
Jann Vasey. 
TO: Stan Wilson, 
Jann Vasey 
FROM: M. Sidwell, Security Guard. 
Monroe, Cottonwood. 
Because of a recent case of vandalism, I Want to put before you a 
history of my functions at Monroe since February 8, 1982. 
I was hired by Darrell Willams to perform the following functions: 
(i) To be here, nights and week-ends? and holidays (Xmas, Labor Day etc 
witTT~WEEK-ENDS specified by Darrell as Saturday afternoons only, 
and all day Sunday. 
(i i) To lock gates 
(iii) To keep a look-out for trespassers and to make the following 
rounds at»week-ends: MORNINGS, possible NOONS, and EVENINGS, 
on Sundays, holidays and only when men, night-crews or Monroe 
personnel were not on location. 
I came to work for Monroe under the above conditions. 
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When Darrell moved elsewhere, and I was under Ken Bartel, my duties 
increased as follows: 
(1) Ken would have me turn off pump at back lake, and this was 
any time between 12 midnight and 3:00 a.m. 
(2) Most of the time Ken did not communicate with me, and screamed 
abuses at me when I had not consistently turned off the pumps 
even though it was understood I would not do so unless instructed. 
(3) Ken subjected me to the most extreme abuse, which was very disturb-
and about which, I complained to Mr.- Robert Parry. inc 
For no given, reason, just about this time, I was made responsible for 
watching the level of the back lake!!! Once again this was not part 
of my job description. The assignment was given to me by Bruce Squires 
and I attempted to watch, and report on the level of the lake. 
It is to be noted that I am not an engineer, nor do I know what is an 
appropriate level for the lake. 
The additional duties were performed without complaint, and 
without asking for more remuneration. 
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When Jann Vasey came on board, I was so delighted to have a wonderful 
new boss, that ^ p e r f o r m e d the extra and additional duties with 
willingness: T^hey were as follows: 
(i) To be present, and make rounds, even though the maintenance crew 
was on location. 
(ii) Saturday mornings were added to my duties, which was something 
1 had not bargained for, when I agreed to work for Darrell. 
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When the rash of increased vandalism came to Monroe, partly because 
of the decreased man-hours worked by the men, my duties were increased 
as follows: 
(i) Rounds Qyery two hours (compare the original contract with Darrell) 
(ii ) Rounds even though the maintenance crew is here (compare the 
original contract with Darrell.) 
I performed these extra duties, out of deference for Jann, who is a 
good man to work for. Other reasons are that I am happy here, that I 
like the privacy, the quiet, that I am not scared cf being alone on the 
plant and that I have great concern for Monroe and its activities 
A further rash of bad vandalism and destruction on plant property ' 
in the Fall, 1985, resulted in a discussion between Jann Vasey and I, 
during which I was asked (and I agreed, rather unwillingly)-- to make 
rounds every hour. I did this right until the fog and the bad weather 
came. When the good weather returned, (second week in Jan. 1986) I resum 
my rounds EVERY TWO HOURS. 
- 7 -
IT IS NOW FOUR YEARS since I was hired as security guard, and I 
wish to make a comparison between the original arrangement and 
what I am in the habit of doing, each week-end. to Drevent vandalism 
With regard to the statement that this is ON FOOT, I am in the 
habit of 'jogging each morning, and I jog around the plant, and 
to the back of the back pit, and make this my "first round". 
(2) 11:00.tJm. Saturdays, and 11:00 a.m. Sundays: 
Inspection using the truck. I get out of the truck, where 
I find it necessary, to inspect the locks. 
NOTE: AFTER MY FIRST ROUND IN THE MORNINGS, COMMON SENSE WOULD 
TELL US THAT my chief concern would be the presence of people 
and the presence of damage or vandalism occurring since the 
previous round. 
(3) 1:00 p.m. Sundays, and Saturdays: 
SIMILAR ROUNDS, -- including inspection of back pit and 
all machinery therein. 
(4) Mid-afternoons Saturdays, and Sunday$: 
Same as (3) 
(5) DUSK (I go by my calendar which giyes the precise time 
for the sun to set and I gauge my round for DUSK). 
SIMILAR ROUNDS. 
(6) EVENINGS: Saturdays, Sundays. FINAL ROUNDS. 
During the week-end of the bad vandalism, breakage of the candy 
machines, etc. 'I was prepared, because of the good weather and 
thaw, for renewed attempts at vandalism. 
I maintain having followed the plan outlined on bottom of page (2) 
and continued above, and I maintain having looked in at the back 
of the office, where the time-clock is. 
It is evident there is a discrepancy between my assumed activities 
and the time discovered at which the time-clock stopped. 
It is my habit to park the truck over the scales, and to head 
for the front door of the front office, and to look inside. 
Although I am remiss in not having reported the vandalism of the 
night before until the following day, there is a possibility the 
time clock could have been tampered with and altered by someone 
who knew how to do this. 
I repeat, my CHIEF CONCERN, after checking locks, is to look out' 
for people, and to prevent vandals from entering. To be accused 
of making a false report and of lying is something absolutely 
unacceptable to me and I request to be cleared immediately. 
To balk at a delayed report is to miss the entire purpose of 
my presence as Security Guard. 
I reported that I had made rounds at 5:30 p.m. prior to discovering 
the damage at 7:00 p.m. I maintain the fact that I did look in 
on the back of the office, and this was presumably Saturday, 
but not Sunday, == since vou claim that thp t im^-rinr\t rsTTTc 
PaGE (4) MEMO 
If I am to work on this problem with Monroe, and resolve the 
threat'of constant vandalism, I wish to regain immediate good faith 
and be cleared Immediately of the accusation of having Ilea to you, 
concerning the time of the damage. 
This document is presented to Monroe, with the statement that I 
know I have performed my duties as security guard according to 
my work agreement with Jann, and that such agreements were over and abo\ 
the duties for which I was hired by Darrell Williams. 
I do not accept the blame for the damage that was done last week-end 
and would have you consider a former problem of semantics. 
In the DRAFT of this report, written and submitted to Jann and 
Stan Wilson on Tuesday morning, I stated "I take no responsibility 
for the acts of vandalism which have occurred." 
IT IS MOST EVIDENT the above statement has made Jann see red and 
my mention of the word semanticsto Mr. Tidwell did not seem to 
make sense. At a later conversation with Jann, I altered my statement 
until it translated into: "I cannot accept the blame" and at that 
moment, Jann understood what I was trying to say, and I presume Mr. Tid' 
would, also. 
As far as "blame" is concerned, there can be none placed on me when 
I perform my duties according to the way they were designated. 
But as regards "responsibility" I feel so terribly responsible 
for the maintenance of safety at Monroe that I have lived through 
several days, -- and several sleepless nights since the incident, 
feeling as if it<was I who actually and physically performed this 
terrible, and crazy damage . 
My own home was burglarized in Fall, 1984 during daylight hours. 
Although several men saw a red bronco parked by my door they 
made no attempt to find out who it was..... (I make the statement 
and I do not blame anyone for this.) 
Since that time, I have taken personal measures to secure my home., 
(f tnt 
( 
On my drafted report, I strongly suggested that Monroe should 
take similar measures and install a burglar alarm. I cannot 
be present at the office for 24 hours. 
As the damage of last week-end was done after 9:30 p.m. I 
want to point out that I was not requested to make late-night 
rounds. It is now evident that my presence and my vigilance 
needs to be extended into the night, and I am presenting a 
very informal proposal to Jann Vasey and Stan Wilson, to try to 
resolve the problems. 
I have a strong desire to remain with your Company, even after 
Cottonwood closes. I feel I have served you well, and over 
and above the original requirements. 
haH t h f l t i r o c c h c h o H on M n n r n r n r n n 
TO: Monroe 
ATTENTION: Jam, with a copy tc Mr. Stan T'"ilson 
FROM: Mrs. M. Timmie Sidwell, 
Guard, Cottonwood Flant, Monroe. 
DATE: Submitted Friday, January 2k, 1986 
SUBJECT: Some informal thoughts about revised security guard 
schedule. 
INTRODUCTION 
This document is the result of extensive research and 
investigation. All conversations have been held in con-
fidence and the security problems of Monrolc have not 
been divulged. 
I request a reciprocal professionalism from Monroe personnel 
in the handling of this document and shall be willing to 
negotiate with Jann Vasey, Stanton Wilson only. I am open 
to converse with Mr. Parry, Doug Clark — or with Frank 
Metcalfe to discuss statistical facts in my feasibility 
study. 
Circulation of this document should be restricted to the 
above-mentioned persons. Please do not make extra copies 
without my permission. 
We are attempting to resolve a serious problem, and it 
can best be done by applying mutual respect for the dignity 
(... and the feelings ...) of all concerned. 
I am keeping the reputation of Monroe well in mind and I 
expect reciprocal consideration from all v^ ith whom I deal. 
• * * 
I suggest this document be weighed against1 the other documents 
I am submitting to you, namely:"(i) a feasibility study examining 
the financial worth of the present security guard services, and 
(ii) A revised edition of the draft memorandum presented to 
Jann Vasey and Mr. Stan Wilson, on Tuesday 1/21/86. 
The suggestions made in this document describe what I feel I 
can offer over and above my present work schedule. They 
are not a committment on my part, at this time. 
Page (2) security guard schedule. 
WORK TO BE CONTRACTED ON A FULL-TIME BASIS 
The work is to be considered full time on the following days: 
(1) Saturdays 
(2) Sundays 
(3) Legal holidays 
(4) Any other times about which guard would be 
notified in advance. 
ALL WORK TO BE RECORDED 
No part of this work would remain unrecorded. Guard would 
require a time-card with check-ins, check-outs. The hourly 
pay would be evaluated separate, distinct and above Mrs. 
Sidwell's present monthly salary. It would, in fact, differ 
from week to week but follow the general pattern of an 8-hour, 
12-hour or 1^-hour working day. 
MONROC'S MODE OF PAYMENT 
Your mode of payment would be. according to your decision, but 
there would be two parts (2) to Mrs. Sidwell's remuneration, as follows: 
(1) Continuance of her present remuneration. 
(2) Additional hourly rate agreed upon. 
EXTENT OF RESPONSIBILITY OF SECURITY GUARD 
To remain the same as the contractual agreement made in February, 1982 
with Darrell Williams. 
ADDITIONAL DUTIES TO BE DETERMINED 
These additional responsibilities will bear their separate res-
ponsibility category, aside from the February, 1982, agreement. 
* * # 
THE NEEDS OF MONROC 
Monroe, Cottonwood, needs active, patrolled coverage for all daylight 
hours (1) 8 to 12 hours in winter and (2) 12 to 1^ hours in summer. 
COORDINATION OF THIS NEED 
Coordination of this need must be made with the availability 
of the present security personnel, namely Mrs. Sidwell. 
However, past damage and vandalism demonstrates the necessity 
for constant patrolling. 
SUGGESTED JOB DESCRIPTION 
(l) Rounds made in the Monroe truck every 2 (two) hours. 
NOTE: "As each round takes approximately 30 minutes, 
with stops at each point specified (there are 8 to 
12 of these), hourly rounds would imply constant 
running of the truck. 
Please consider this factor, and come up with your 
decisions. 
(1) — A: ALTERNATIVE: 
Rounds made very 90 minutes could be considered. 
PagS (3) security guard schedule. 
SUGGESTED JOB DESCRIPTION, (continued) 
(2) SATURDAYS 
The requirements of Monroe are 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. 
fall and winter, with original guard duties on top of this 
in the evenings. 'These duties would reiiain as set in 1982. 
The requirements would increase when summer comes. 
(3) SUNDAYS 
Same as (2) 
(*0 HOLIDAYS 
Same as (2) 
DUTIES OF SECURITY GUARD 
(5) (to fall as part of "jc^ b 
description") 
(5) The duties of the Guard would be as follows: 
Rounds and surveillance at specied designated points: 
(i) Office, two doors 
(ii) Cement plant (Tey's office, upstairs at back) 
(iii) Chemical lab (upstairs) -- the doprs facing west 
(iv) Tool shed 
(v) Large grease shop 
(vi) Extreme back gravel pit. — to inspect machinery and 
prevent vandalism 
(vii) Metal shed (grease shop) close tc warming hut. 
THE SALT LAKE CITY "SECURITY MARKET" 
AVAILABLE SERVICES 
I have called four security companies, without Identifying Monroe 
or giving my name, to request rates and conditions. 
INFORMATION SHARED 
I provided the following information: 
(1) ^ 0 to 50 acres of property with obstructed visibility 
to outlying parts. 
(2) Machinery at outlying parts of the property 
(3) Fenced in, with locked gates, but easy for people to enter. 
(k) Number of surveillance points, buildings etc. 8 to 12 
buildings, or more, with locks at specific points. 
SUMMARY OF CONVERSATIONS 
page \L*j securiu,y gutuu OUHCUHAO.^. 
SUMMARY OF CONVERSATIONS (continued from page (3) ) 
(1) Three, out of the four manages of security companies 
said it was not possible for one person to (a) properly 
patrol ^0 to 50 acres and 7 to 10 buiMngs, and (b) 
expect to deter the vandalism problems. 
(NOTE: I think this will will clauify what I have been saying 
to Monroe for one year, now, that"I cannot be held responsible., 
if damage occurs with the part-time security guard arrangements 
during daylight hours, when no men are at the plant.) 
(2) The minimum hours offered by any one of these four security 
companies is 4 hours, (one company)-, at a rate of $6.50 
or more per hour. 
The others have a minimum of 8 hours at either $6.50 minimum, 
$6.00 or/(and) $5.95. 
None of them offered cheaper rates for 12-1^ hours. 
(3) The understood conditions were that Guard has responsibility of 
company vehicle. Guard is unarmed. Whether he patrols, or stays 
put, the rate runs at a minimum of $5*95 up to minimum $6.50 
and he receives a wage of at least $^.50 per hour. . 
H 
* * * * * * * Ctf £ 
PROPOSAL !$ 
u 
o 
The following services offered by Mrs Sidwell to Monroe on a 
full-time basis for certain days are: © 
(1) Subject to change w 
(2) Must adhere to all conditions on page (l) and all other 
stipulations which precede this proposal. 
HOURS 
CO -
CD - P 
• H C 
+ * <D 
CD 
Due to Monroe's needs, which change according to daylight, <H U 
season, weather and operation of plant — these hours are subject £ <$ 
to change: •gj ) c s l 
•H 00 
MRS SIDWELL1 s PROPOSAL o 2^ <\ 
HOURS: Saturdays: 9*.30 to 5:30 full time, followed by resumption of j 
JOB DESCRIPTION: As stated on pages: [2) and (3) of this document. 
Sundays: Noon to 12:30 until 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. full time, 
followed by resumption of original duties, as per 
February, 1982 contract. 
Holidays: The work shall be full time, eight (8) hours, 
with no exceptions. 
HOURS: Your choice of hours, either start 9:30 continue to 
5J 30 or start 10:30, continue to 6: 30.... or other. 
DUTIES FOR ALL THREE CATEGORIES, Saturdays, Sundays, Holidays: 
As previously suggested and described on pp. 2 and 3, with 
Page (5) security guard schedule 
Notes on guard's extraterritorial activities: 
BEFORE EXAMINING THE SUBJECT OF REMUNERATION
 f( WE NEED TO 
CONSIDER THE GUARD AS A HUMAN BEING AND BE INFORMED OF THE 
FOLLOWING: 
(1) I attend the Episcopal Church on Sunday roomings occasionally. 
I request the autonomy of continuing with) this habit. A full-time 
day is eight hours. I have therefore proposed my services to 
you from noon to eight, on Sundays. 
(1) — (A) I would suggest you hire security for Sunday mornings 
to remain on the property until about noon. I may be home, 
and I may be gone. I commit myself to fulfill my original 
duties, being that, of: 
"one round Sunday mornings, 
one round Sunday noon." 
(1) — (B) I would suggest any security personnel you hire be based 
at the front office, and make his/her rounds in the truck, as 
I do. , 
My personal problem with finding a substitute is that I do 
not care for a stranger to come into my home. 
(2) Saturdays. Evenings: 
I am a member of the Utah Symphony Association and volunteer 
my services to this organization. I attend the Symphony occasion-
ally on Saturdays at 8. 
I commit myself to fulfill my original duties, for Saturdays, 
being that I make a round last thing at night, if I go out. 
(3) The initial agreement made in 1982 gave leeway for theater 
and symphony concerts. At that time, the night crew was 
working every night. 
PLEASE CONSIDER THESE POSSIBLE ABSENCES VERY CAREFULLY. ANY 
COMMITMENT I SHALL MAKE TO MONROC AT THIS TIME, WOULD BE MADE 
WITH THE CERTAINTY THAT I WOULD BE ABLE TO ADHERE TO THE COMMITMENT 
WITHOUT CONSTANT CHANGES AND RENEGOCIATIONS. 
Proposed resolution of possible problem 
I think, when I absent myself in the evenings, at week-ends or 
on week-nights when the night maintenance crew is not here, that 
I should report to Jann with a phone call to his home, informing 
him of my absence before it occurs. 
Page (6) security guard schedule 
REMUNERATION 
After extensive study, conversations with specialists, executives 
and others, it has become evident to me that my committment as 
to hours of full-time work will eventually have to be shared with 
another party, if Monroe is to receive adequate coverage. This 
will become evident in summer. Although I am responsible for my 
duties as resident guard, summer-time will bring about a grey area 
— margin between daylight and night hours, -- a margin extending 
into 12 to 1^-hour days, when I cannot commit myself to full-time 
commitments. 
EXCHANGEABLE DUTIES 
My remuneration for full-time work must be sufficient for me to 
be able to call in a substitute, full-time guard, (presumably for 
hours extended beyond eight (8) ). 
REMUNERATION 
Any agreed-upon remuneration will be negotiable , and be decided 
after considering all the information provided, from all my sources 
and reasearch. 
It is evident that the remuneration of a substitute guard should 
match mine. 
Alternatives To request one of the men to sit in the office to 
perform extended surveillance after any period of 8 hours. 
GUARDfs ACCESS TO TELEPHONE 
I must have immediate access for the purpose of notifying Police. 
Please provide me with a key to the office. 
Alternative 
I would prefer to have a 250 piece (quarter) hidden somewhere 
so as to have access to the pay phone at back of office. 
Returning to my mobile home to use the telephone would be the 
same as letting any present vandals slip away. 
: Monroe 
OM: Mrs. M. Timmie Sidwell 
Security Guard, 
Cottonwood plant. 
TE 24 January 1986 
SUBJECT: Analysis: 
Estimated dollar value of my 
present total work-hours. 
ESUMPTION: 
is understood by all concerned that any hours during which Security Guard 
expected to be on location should be given some financial value. 
STRUCTURE OF THIS ANALYSIS 
) First a summary of the job description 
This job description is in five categories: (A), (B), (C), (D) and (E) 
) 
Second, each category is evaluated in man hour$. 
These man hours are stated on a weekly and on a monthly basis 
) Third, the dollar value of each category is presented, first by the 
hour, then by the week, and finally by the month. 
ECIAL NOTE: 
e resulting figures are for the purpose of comparison with my present 
nthly salary; not for the purpose of argument or complaint concerning 
id present salary. 
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iB DESCRIPTION, MONROC SECURITY GUARD, COTTONWOOD PLANT 
JEGORY (A) To be present on location each night of the week. 
JEGORY (B) To be present on location *(i) Saturday afternoons 
(or Whenever men are not working, 
and no-one is there) 
(ii) All day Sunday 
(iii) On specified holidays 
JEGORY (C) To lock the gates each night, first Checking that everyone 
has left the plant. 
JEGORY (D) To make rounds three times per day, Maximum, on days designa-
ted in (B) (above). To evict trespassers and to make reports 
on the activity to the plant foreman after any incidents. 
JEGORY (E) P resump t i on : That t he guard l i v e oh p remises . 
lysis of man hours -
EGORY (E) -- continued: 
It is to be noted that this final condition implies 
the presence of my possessions and my valuables on location; 
it implies a vulnerability similar to that experienced by 
Monroe, with its assets on the plant. 
It is to be noted that my property is subject to similar 
wear and tear, corrosion by the immediate elements and the dust 
such as is present in a ^ supra-ordinary circumstance; a gravel 
plant. 
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'EGORY (A) The hourly evaluation for this category is WEEKLY HOURS 
7 days of twelve hours, a normal night-time 
when I am expected to be on location. 84 hours 
"EGORY (B) The hourly evaluation of this category is 
Saturdays, 6 hours, Sundays 12, hours, and 
the average weekly hours for 10 holidays 
per year, being 2 1/2 hours per week . . . . . 20 1/2 
TOTAL FOR CATEGORIES (A) and (B) 104 1/2 hrs 
TEGORY (C) To lock gates each night . . (weekly):... 1 3/4 hrs. 
FEGORY (D) To make rounds 3 times per day at week-ends,
 5 , /2 h 
and once at night during the week . . .(weekly) ' 
To make reports and submit them. . . . (weekly) 20 minutes 
TOTAL FOR CATEGORIES (C) and (D) 
7 hours 50 mins 
TEG0RY (E) 
tangible defrayments such as "he interest on my mobile home, the exposure to 
st and the exposureof my person to the noise of machinery 5 days per week 
rely has some financial equivalent. As it cannot be evaluated, it could 
set off against the expense incurred by Monroe for lights and heat. 
- 3 -
n proceeding to place a dollar value for each category of man-hours stated in 
ove, I have taken, first minimum wage. 
he minimum wage is the legal rate of remuneration. 
.econd, I have taken $2.00 per hour because this is the rate paid to a 
ibysitter who sleeps with the children when the parents are away. The 
itionale for this is that, about twice during a 12-month period would 
lere be a need for the babysitter to encounter and deal with an emergency, 
milarly, the security guard at Monroe is there (as per the request of 
)nroc) for the purpose of emergencies. 
urd, I have taken the extreme minimum dollar value you could place upon 
I mandatory presence on location -- namely, $1:00 per hour. 
FURTHER NOTES ON - 3 -
lis type of analysis is useless unless the alternatives are kept well in mind: 
n my case, the alternative presented is that, as an autonomous human being, I 
ysis of man hours 
tain the choice to be away from home some nights, sometimes overnight 
some week-ends; to go to the mountains some Sundays. 
I took on the job of security guard, I was awar^ that this would be 
ailed, and I made the choices accordingly. However, for this very 
on, it is presumed that my presence on location has some financial value, 
at times when I am not physically working, or making rounds. 
RTANT: Once again, nothing in the above paragraph is intended as a 
complaint, but rather as a further analysis of the value 
of man-hours. 
w proceed to apply a minimum wage upon the total 104 1/2 hours, 
to apply a value of $2.00 per hour upon the total 104 1/2 hours 
then finally, a value of $1.00 per hour upon this total 104 1/2 hours, 
ol lows: 
3.35 TOTAL WEEKLY TOTAL MONTHLY FOR CATEGORIES (A) anc 
$350.07 $1.400.2|8 (B; 
2.00 209.00 836.qO 
1.00 104.50 418.00 
(see footnote (1)) 
ineration for categories (C) and (D) 
'ou will refer back to page (1), Section - 1 - yoij will see that 
;e categories involve physical work, surveillance^ rounds, etc. etc, 
\ placing a total worth upon these hours of $5.75 per hour. 
ten give a choice between subtracting from said $$.75 
the minimum wage included into the total wage for 1041/2hours 
Subtracting the $2.00 which was estimated as an alternative 
:c) The $1.00 per hour.
 ( S E E p A Q E ( 4 ) } 
TN0TE (from above;: 
The figure of $418.00 per month is the closest to what I am now earning 
and covers remuneration for my presence only at s 1.00 per hour. It constitute 
no remuneration whatsoever for active guard duties. 
Analysis of 
(4) 
man hours 
BASE VALUE FOR ACTIVE GUARD DUTY: $5.75: 
TOTAL WEEKLY 
5.75 less 3.35 for 7 hours 50 minutes $18.80 
5.75 less $2.00 for 7 hours 50 minutes 29.37 
5.75 lessl.OO per hour for 7 hours 50 minutes. 37.21 
TOTAL MONTHLY 
$72.50 
117.48 
148.84 
(Your choice for totals above, depends upon 
your financial evaluation of my basic 
hours on location). 
TOTALS 
one Add categories A, B, C, and D as per your 
choice out of the three choices given to 
assess hours on location, my total financial 
worth to Monroe under the present job description 
totals to $565.84 per month using the minimum of 
$1.00 per hour for my total number of hours on 
location., _ *_+„„+„
 f0\\ Other figures below, (see footnote (2); 
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SUMMARY 
Without considering the intangible advantages and disadvantages 
stated in Section (E) which, according to our previous conversations 
are supposed to balance out your contribution to lights and heat, the mean 
figure (going exactly between maximum figures) is a monthly $1021.16 
(... and note, I do NOT use the word "salary" for fear you will interpret 
this analysis as a complaint). 
Respectfully subm 
immie 
Security, 
Cottonwood plant. 
(2) Weekly total using minimum wage is $368.87 per week 
and, using $2.00 base, $238.37. 
(3) I am attaching a scratch-sheet of figures to this page. 
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MONROC, INC. 
1730 BECK STREET / P.O. BOX 537 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110 
(801) 359-3701 
January 28, 1986 
Ms, Timmie Sidwell 
P. 0. Box 521034 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152 
Dear Ms. Sidwell: 
Monroe, Inc, has decided to discontinue the use of your 
services in the security function at the Cottonwood Heights Plant. 
As per our agreement, Monroe is to give you a 30 day notice 
of its wishes to discontinue the agreement. However, because Df 
the present inclement weather and in fairness to you, Monroe will 
extend this period for you to remove your trailer and personal 
possessions until March 31, 1986. If for any reason you wish to 
leave before that time, please feel free to do so. 
This decision is final and we appreciate your services in the 
past years. 
Sincerely, 
MONROC, INC. 
Jan Vasey 
Manager s 
E! Wilson 
Vice-President 
SEWrba 
cc: Robert A. Parry 
